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RECENT DECISIONS
ANTITRUST-INTRA-CORPORATE CoNsPmAcy-Unincorporated divisions
of a corporation are legally capable of conspiring with each other in viola-
tion of Section 1 of the Sherman Act.'
Hawaiian Oke & Liquors, Ltd. v. Joseph E. Seagram and Sons, Inc.,
272 F. Supp. 915 (D. Hawaii, 1967), appeal docketed, No. -, 9th Cir.
(1967).
Plaintiff Hawaiian Oke brought this action pursuant to Section 4 of the
Clayton Act to recover treble damages, alleging a conspiracy to elimi-
nate plaintiff from the wholesale liquor business. Named as defendants
were several corporations.3 However, for the purpose of determining
whether or not there had been a combination or conspiracy the plaintiff
requested that the jury be instructed to treat the unincorporated divisions
of defendant House of Seagram as separate entities. The issue presented
-whether a horizontal conspiracy among unincorporated divisions of a
single corporation is legally possible-was one of first impression. The
U.S. District Court for Hawaii, in an opinion by Chief Judge Pence,
responded affirmatively to this question and instructed the jury in ac-
cordance with its determination (Memorandum Decision and Ruling on
Plaintiff's Requested Instruction Number 36 Concerning Possible Intra-
corporate Conspiracy) .'
The defendant, House of Seagram, invoked the single-trader defense,
i.e., as a matter of law, a corporation cannot conspire with itself; there-
fore, the unincorporated sales divisions of the corporation cannot enter
into a conspiracy among themselves. To support its view defendant cited
several cases: In Nelson Radio & Supply Co. v. Motorola,5 it was held
that the defendant corporation could not conspire with its officers, em-
ployees, representatives and agents. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the
1. 26 STAT. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (hereinafter referred to as Section
1). [Any contract, combination or conspiracy in restraint of trade is made illegal].
2. 38 STAT. 730 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-17
3. Named as defendants were Joseph E. Seagram and Sons, Inc., The House of Seagram,
Inc., McKesson & Robbins, Inc., Barton Distilling Co., and Burton Western Distilling Co.
4. Plaintiff's Revised Instruction No. 36:
Calvert Distilling Co., Four Roses Distilling Co. and Frankfort Distilling Co.
were separate unincorporated divisions of the defendant House of Seagram, Inc.
at the time that each terminated dealings with Hawaiian Oke.
Each of these divisions of defendant House of Seagram, Inc., shall be treated
by you as separate entities for the purpose of determining whether or not there
has been a combination or conspiracy, as I have heretofore defined those terms, to
terminate Hawaiian Oke as their respective distributor. For the purpose of returning
a verdict, however, you will consider these divisions as being the defendant House
of Seagram, Inc. 272 F. Supp. at 917.
$. 200 F.2d 911 (5th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 925 (1953).
DUQUESNE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
Fifth Circuit reasoned that "the allegation claiming the existence of a
conspiracy under Section 1 contains a more fundamental defect. It is
basic in the law of conspiracy that you must have two persons or entities
to have a conspiracy. A corporation cannot conspire with itself any more
than a private individual can ... ."' In Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting
System, Inc.7 it was alleged that CBS had conspired with CBS-TV, an
unincorporated division, and others. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia considered the allegation as being "obviously un-
sound. It is in reality a charge that CBS conspired with itself."'
On appeal, the United States Supreme Court, in a sharply divided
opinion, reversed the decision on other grounds. Mr. Justice Clark, how-
ever, did give some indication that an intra-corporate conspiracy was
possible.'" Defendant's authority also included Deter jet Corp. v. United
Aircraft Corp.," Kemwel Automotive Corp. v. Ford Motor Co.,12 and
Johnny Maddox Motor Co. v. Ford Motor Co.,"3 wherein motions for
dismissal or summary judgment were granted as to allegation of con-
spiracy between a corporation and its unincorporated division.
The Hawaiian Oke court, however, did not feel that the broad principle
of law laid down in Nelson, supra, was applicable to the present fact
situation. It reasoned that previous decisions had dealt with vertical cor-
porate structure (a corporation and its unincorporated division) whereas
the instant litigation concerned itself with an alleged conspiracy among
business entities on the same level of the corporate structure. Not being
bound within the confines of precedent, the court turned its attention to
6. Id. at 914.
7. 284 F.2d 599 (D.C. Cir. 1960), reversed on other grounds, 368 U.S. 464 (1962).
8. Id. at 603.
9. The Supreme Court felt that there was some question as to the status of one of the
alleged conspirators. The question of whether the alleged conspirator was in fact an em-
ployee was a question for the jury; therefore defendant's motion for summary judgment
should not have been granted.
10. 368 U.S. 464, 469, n.4: "We do not pass upon the point urged by Poller that under
the CBS corporate arrangement of divisions, with separate offices and autonomy in each,
the divisions came within the rule as to corporate subsidiaries."
Whether the Court intended to imply that an intra-corporate conspiracy was possible
or not is unclear. However, this footnote was referred in the instant opinion, obviously to
buttress its argument. This very point was urged in Plaintiff's Memorandum in Support
of Plaintiff's Proposed Jury Instruction No. 36 Re Divisions of the House of Seagram, Inc.
at 4, and again at 5 where it is stated, "it [the Court's footnote 4] is a compelling inference
that where the arrangement involves autonomous, separately managed, and actually com-
petitive units, liability is certain."
But see Stengel, Intra-Enterprise Conspiracy under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 35
Miss. L.J. 5, 26 (1963) wherein reference is made to the Court's footnote as being "un-
fortunate."
11. 211 F. Supp. 348 (D. Del. 1962).
12. 1966 Trade Cases f 71,882 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
13. 202 F. Supp. 103 (W.D. Tex. 1960).
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determining whether these horizontal business divisions should be con-
sidered as separate legal entities capable of conspiracy. The affirmative
resolution of this issue by the Hawaiian Oke court depended upon the
acceptance of two propositions, viz., that "substance rather than form
should govern,"' 4 and, logically following, a "factual conclusion that a
division has independence of action in the relevant business activity .... 11
Leading cases have held that a parent corporation may conspire with its
subsidiary 6 and that subsidiaries of a common parent are capable of con-
spiring with one another. 7 Thus, acording to the instant decision, the
form in which a corporation is cast-wholly owned subsidiaries or unin-
corporated divisions-will not insulate a corporation from a Section 1
violation when, in substance, the business entity in question has inde-
pendence of action in the relevant business activity.' 8 According to the
Hawaiian Oke court, "independence" is present if the business entity is
"endowed with separable, self-generated and moving power to act in the
pertinent area of economic activity. .. 2"
With leave to disregard corporate form the Hawaiian Oke court con-
cerned itself with a determination of whether the "independence of ac-
tion was sufficiently manifest to charge the divisions of the defendant
with conspiracy. The fact that the divisions in question were, prior to
July 31, 1954, wholly owned subsidiaries which were found to be legally
capable of conspiracy in Kiefer-Stewart v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons,
Inc." weighed heavily against the defendant.2 Upon questioning of
14. 272 F. Supp. at 919, quoting from Reines Distributors, Inc. v. Admiral Corporation,
256 F. Supp. 581, 583 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); see also United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S.
218, 227 (1947). Reines Distributors, Inc. was an action brought to determine whether a
division could be a purchaser or customer under Sections 2(a), (d) and (e) of the Clayton
Act, as amended by the Robinson-Patman Act (Title 15 U.S.C. § 13); however in dicta in
Reines at 583, it was stated that the position that divisions cannot conspire with the corpora-
tion for purposes of Section 1 of the Sherman Act "seems logical."
15. 272 F. Supp at 919.
16. Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951); United States v.
Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218 (1947).
17. Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211 (1951). Herein
subsidiaries were found to be in actual competition with each other.
18. Impetus is given to these conclusions by the Court's reliance on Standard Oil Co.
of New Jersey v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 59 (1911) wherein Section 1 of the Sherman
Act was construed to be "all encompassing."
19. 272 F. Supp. at 920.
20. 340 U.S. 211 (1951).
21. Prior to the instant decision it was almost unanimously thought that a change in
form (for example, a change from the separate corporate existence of the wholly owned
subsidiary to an unincorporated division) would provide against allegations of conspiracy.
Responsible, at least in part, were the statements by government counsel arguing Timken
Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951) that "you must have two entities
to have a conspiracy," and that separate corporate form makes the difference. This argu-
ment is reported 19 U.S.L. WEEK 3219 et seq. Mr. Justice Jackson, dissenting in Timken,
1967-19681 .159
DUQUESNE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
defendant's counsel, it appeared, that, subsequent to Seagram's reorgani-
zation, the divisions remained as "independent" as they were prior to the
reorganization. The court concluded that the divisions in question were
"self-contained," and "independent sales divisions." 2 Therefore, any
deviation by these autonomous divisions from independent action to
concerted action among them, would render the divisions subject to the
antitrust laws. The court made pointedly clear that their decision rested
solely on the fact that the divisions had separate sales organizations.
Since the conspiracy alleged was to terminate plaintiff as defendant's sales
representative, the only relevant business function was distribution. Other
joint or common functions of the corporation and division were of no
moment in the light of divided responsibility for marketing.
It is submitted that the instant opinion is evidence of a judicial attempt
to protect the remnants of a Jeffersonian competitive system.23 It becomes
arduous, however, to surmount the conceptual difficulties imposed by
Section 1, for, by its very terms, duality is required. 4 It is obvious in
cases such as Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States,2 United States
v. Yellow Cab Co.26 and Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram &
Sons, Inc.2 that the requisite plurality of "persons" is being sought where
it would not otherwise be found.
The utility of the instant decision is questionable. Cannot the very
economic abuse that the Hawaiian Oke court attempts to guard against
be achieved by a slight modification in corporate form, i.e., reorganiza-
tion of the sales division so as to place decision making responsibility in
one corporate manager, as contrasted with separate divisional managers,
thereby escaping the proscriptions of Section 1? Certainly a corporation
could so intertwine its corporate and divisional structure so as to fail to
qualify as having "independent business activity" yet still achieve the
same undesirable result. The next step Hawaiian Oke type courts might
take would be to disregard form altogether and look merely for a restraint
discusses this point at 606 and states at 607: "I think that result [conspiracy found by the
majority] places too much weight on labels."
Many text writers "assumed" that a change in form was adequate compliance with
Section 1, see, for one instance, Oppenheim, Federal Antitrust Legislation: Guideposts to a
Revised National Antitrust Policy, 50 MIca. L. REv. 1139 (1952).
22. 272 F. Supp. at 923.
23. That economic abuse, market control and public injury are the primary concern of
the courts in this particular area see: Adelman, Effective Competition and the Antitrust
Laws 61 HIv. L. REv. 1289, 1317 (1948); Fuller, Problems Ahead for " Business," 2
ABA ANTITRUST SECTION 61, 72 (1953); Note, The Nature of a Sherman Act Conspiracy, 54
COLum. L. Rxv. 1108, 1127 (1954).
24. See Rahl, Conspiracy and the Anti-Trust Laws, 44 ILL. L. REv. 743, 752 (1950) for
a critical and penetrating analysis of the requirements of conspiracy under Section 1 of the
Sherman Act.
25. 341 U.S. 593 (1951).
26. 332 U.S. 218 (1947).
27. 340 U.S. 211 (1951).
(Vol. 6:157
RECENT DECISIONS
of trade28 which was not made illegal by Section 1.29 A decision which
could be so easily frustrated by a minor corporate maneuver (and which
itself reacted to the attempt by Seagram to frustrate a previous decision,
namely Kiefer-Stewart) may justifiably be viewed with a certain sus-
picion. But other aspects of the decision are equally troublesome. No
doubt, according to the present decision, a host of American industries
are, at this very moment, infested with conspiracies," and at the mercy
of treble damage seekers.
The instant case appears to be an attempt by the judiciary to eco-
nomically regulate the business community in the nebulous area between
pure competition and obvious monopoly. It may well be that existing
antitrust law is inadequate to check the economic abuses of a highly
developed corporate society, but the question remains whether the intra-
corporate conspiracy doctrine should serve this office. Suggestions of
authorities in the antitrust field vary greatly in their attempt to resolve
this enigma. In line with the decision in the instant case is the view that
any reasonable construction of enabling statutes is vindicable. 3" Others
urge the use of existing law,3 2 Viz. the Clayton Act, Robinson-Patman
Amendment, FTC Act,33 and, when necessary, Section 2 of the Sherman
Act to provide against abusive economic expedients. This does have the
redeeming characteristic of not distorting Section 1." Of course, new
antitrust legislation may offer the best solution.
As long as the courts continue to beat a square conspiracy into a round
legal conceptual mold, there will be no satisfactory resolution. It is sub-
mitted that the courts should abandon the intra-corporate conspiracy
doctrine and address their attention to the development of more work-
able, stable, and certain legal principles.
Edward C. Land, Jr.
28. McQuade, Conspiracy, Multicorporate Enterprises, and Section 1 of the Sherman
Act, 41 VA. L. REv. 183 (1955). See also Rahl, supra note 24, at 766 where the author
states: "This development [looking only for restraints of trade] would perhaps actually be
attractive except for the fact that the sudden complete departure of the duality quality of
conspiracy would expose a naked restraint of trade doctrine incapable of facing the legal
world."
29. United States v. Chicago Board of Trade 246 U.S. 231 (1918). See also Rahl, supra
note 24.
30. Cf. Sprunk, Intra-Enterprise Conspiracy, 9 ABA ANTITRUST SECTION 20, 21, 24
(1956).
31. Barndt, Two-Trees or One?-The Problem of Intra-Enterprise Conspiracy, 23
MONTANA L. REV. 158 (1962). Contra, Handler, Contract, Combination or Conspiracy, 3
ABA ANTITRUST SECTION 38, 48 (1953): "Companies should not be punished for conspiracy
when they have not conspired. They should not be mulcted for large recoveries when there
has been no violation of the law."
32. McQuade, supra note 28.
33. Private litigants may not avail themselves of the FTC Act.
34. There are, however, many tactical advantages to a Section 1 prosecution, see Com-
ment, Intra-Enterprise Conspiracy under the Sherman Act, 63 YALE L.J. 372 (1954).
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